Options Facing Congress in Renewing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act by Kunreuther, Howard & Michel-Kerjan, Erwann
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative
7-2014
Options Facing Congress in Renewing the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
Howard Kunreuther
University of Pennsylvania, kunreuth@wharton.upenn.edu
Erwann Michel-Kerjan
University of Pennsylvania, erwannmk@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management
Commons, Insurance Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/28
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kunreuther, Howard and Michel-Kerjan, Erwann, "Options Facing Congress in Renewing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act" (2014).
Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative. Book 28.
http://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/28
Options Facing Congress in Renewing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
Summary
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) is set to expire at the end of 2014 and is currently under debate in
Congress. Renewing TRIA may limit the amount of disaster relief the federal government would contribute
after a terrorist attack, but the different options under which TRIA might be renewed carry implications for
how losses from any attack would be spread between commercial policyholders, insurers, and taxpayers.
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PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXT
On July 17, 2014, the U.S. Senate passed 
S. 22441, as amended, to extend the Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) for seven 
years. The House is also expected to bring 
H.R. 48712, which reauthorizes TRIA for 
five years with different provisions, to the 
floor for a vote before the end of the sum-
mer. TRIA, a public-private partnership, 
was established in 2002 when most insurers 
and reinsurers stopped covering losses from 
terrorism attacks after they paid claims of 
$32 billion (2001 prices; $44 billion in 2014 
prices; 2/3 of which was reinsured) from 
the damage caused on September 11, 2001 
(9/11 hereafter). 
The claims from 9/11 dwarfed those 
from previous terrorism-related property 
losses. By comparison, the truck bomb 
detonated by Al Qaeda in the garage of the 
North Tower of New York City’s World 
Trade Center in February 1993 caused just 
over $750 million in insured losses; the 
bomb discharged by Timothy McVeigh 
outside the Alfred Murrah Federal Building 
in downtown Oklahoma City in April 1995 
resulted in damages totaling $650 million.
In the wake of the devastating coor-
dinated attack by Al Qaeda on 9/11, most 
insurers and reinsurers—faced with the 
sudden realization that terrorist attacks 
could be catastrophic—stopped offering 
coverage for terrorism in the United States 
unless required to do so. As a result, many 
businesses operating in the U.S. found it 
increasingly difficult to purchase commercial 
property insurance that included the risk 
of terrorism. Real estate and commercial 
ventures stalled because of an inability to 
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brief in brief
• In determining the future of TRIA in the 
coming weeks and months, Congress 
and the Administration will be making 
important decisions on the nature of risk-
sharing arrangements between the public 
and private sectors.
• The authors perform an analysis of the 
exposure of 764 insurers to terrorism risk 
using the ratio of TRIA deductible over 
surplus as a proxy, and indicate how 
that exposure would change for differ-
ent deductible levels.
• Using a terrorism risk model developed 
in collaboration with the modeling firm 
Risk Management Solutions, the authors 
also analyze how economic losses under 
different terrorist attack scenarios would 
be shared among key stakeholders,  
comparing the arrangements under the 
current TRIA program to alternative ter-
rorism risk insurance designs articulated 
recently by the U.S. Senate and House. 
• Renewing TRIA may limit the amount of 
disaster relief the federal government 
would contribute after a terrorist attack, 
but the different options under which 
TRIA might be renewed carry implica-
tions for how losses from any attack 
would be spread between commercial  
policyholders, insurers, and taxpayers.
obtain the requisite insurance protection. By 
law, insurance companies offering workers’ 
compensation insurance cannot exclude the 
peril of terrorism, nor can insurers exclude 
terrorism from the “fire following” cover-
age in certain states. As a result, workers’ 
compensation insurance premiums increased 
significantly after the 9/11 attack and many 
carriers did not renew some of their policies 
in major metropolitan areas.
Responding to these concerns, the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) was 
enacted at the end of 2002 as a temporary 
measure to increase the availability of cover-
age for terrorist acts. TRIA was designed to 
achieve a balance of risk sharing between 
the insurance industry, commercial policy-
holders and the federal government (taxpay-
ers). TRIA requires that all U.S. insurance 
companies offer terrorism coverage to 
commercial firms—on the same terms and 
conditions provided by their commercial 
insurance policies for other perils—in 
exchange for free up-front reinsurance from 
the federal government against catastrophic 
losses. Firms may be required to purchase 
this coverage by state law. In fact, there was 
a strong demand for coverage by commercial 
firms due to lending requirements and/or 
a desire to be protected against losses from 
future attacks.3 TRIA was renewed for two 
years in 2005, and again for seven years in 
2007, with the private sector assuming more 
of the risk with each extension of the pro-
gram but with the federal government still 
providing reinsurance against catastrophic 
terrorist attacks at no charge. As a result of 
TRIA’s passage, terrorism insurance is now 
widely available and many businesses in the 
United States have protected themselves 
against these losses. Market analysis by two 
large insurance brokers, Aon and Marsh, 
indicates that on average 60% of their 
clients (typically large firms) have purchased 
terrorism insurance today. But insurers have 
also indicated that they could not cover that 
risk on their own, so a large private market 
has not yet emerged. 
To assist Congress and the Administra-
tion in their evaluation of renewal options 
before the program expires at the end of 
2014, this Issue Brief presents an analy-
sis of how economic losses from terrorist 
attacks would be shared among the different 
stakeholders under the current TRIA pro-
gram and the Senate and House alternative 
designs. To do this, we examined three dif-
ferent terrorist attack scenarios in four large 
cities located in different parts of the United 
States: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles 
and New York. Our analysis complements 
recent publications on terrorism risk and 
insurance, several Congressional hear-
ings that took place in the House and the 
Senate in 2012, 2013 and 2014, reports by 
the President’s Working Group, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office, the Congres-
sional Research Services, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, as well as insurance industry stud-
ies on take up rates and terrorism pricing 
based on their portfolios of clients. A fuller 
discussion of the findings summarized in 
this brief can be found in the Wharton Risk 
Center’s larger report, TRIA After 2014, 4  
available free of charge on the website of the 
Wharton Risk Center: http://www.wharton.
upenn.edu/riskcenter. 
RISK-SHARING STRUCTURE 
OF THE TRIA PARTNERSHIP 
AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
We now contrast the current TRIA program 
with the legislation proposed by the Senate 
and House. 
CURRENT DESIGN 
Under TRIA’s current design, the costs 
from “certified” terrorism events that result 
in over $100 million (the program trigger) 
in insured industry losses in TRIA-eligible 
lines of business are shared as follows:
•  Commercial policyholders are responsible 
for paying any losses within their standard 
insurance policy deductibles. 
• Insurance companies then provide cover-
age for all losses in excess of these policy 
deductibles, if total industry losses do not 
exceed $100 billion. 
• The federal government reinsures the 
insurer’s terrorism loss in excess of a 
TRIA deductible percent (D*) for losses 
equal to 20% of that company’s prior 
year’s direct earned premium (DEP) for 
the lines covered under the program. 
 D* has increased from 1% in 2002 to 20% 
since 2007. 
• Losses in excess of each insurer’s deduct-
ible (D*) are shared 15/85 between the 
insurers and the federal government. This 
coinsurance arrangement was 10/90 when 
TRIA was first passed.
• Should total insurance industry losses 
exceed $100 billion, primary insurers are 
responsible for reimbursing policyhold-
ers only for their proportionate share of 
losses up to $100 billion, and Congress 
shall determine the procedure and source 
of any payments for the uninsured losses. 
• The federal government recoups its pay-
ments under TRIA by levying surcharges 
on all commercially insured policyholders 
at a rate of 133% of its payments below 
the insurance marketplace aggregate reten-
tion – an amount currently set at $27.5 
billion – and above the aggregate insurers’ 
uncompensated outlays (i.e., insurer losses 
within the deductible and coinsurance) 
during the calendar year. 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The Senate bill modifies the current pro-
gram in several ways:
• Insurers’ coinsurance percentage on certi-
fied terrorism events would gradually 
increase over 5 years from the current 
15% to 20%. 
• The marketplace aggregate retention 
would increase from the current $27.5 bil-
lion by $2 billion annually until it reaches 
$37.5 billion. 5
      
 1 “Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act 
of 2014,” https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/
senate-bill/2244.
 2  “TRIA Reform Act of 2014,” https://beta.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4871.
 3  Kunreuther, H., and Michel-Kerjan, E. (2004). “Policy 
Watch: Challenges for Terrorism Risk Insurance in the 
United States,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18: 4, 
pp. 201-214.
 4  Kunreuther, H., Michel-Kerjan, E., Lewis, C., Muir-Wood, 
R. and G. Woo (2014). TRIA After 2014. Examining Risk 
Sharing Under Current and Alternative Designs. Center 
for Risk Management, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA. 
5 For purpose of our analysis we assume a $37.5 billion 
market retention for the Senate bill. This figure might 
vary depending on the date of the attack, since the bill 
increases the retention incrementally by $2 billion a year 
over 5 years up to $37.5 billion.  
 
 
The House bill differs from the Senate 
bill in the following ways: 
•  It would increase the program trigger 
from $100 million to $500 million.
•  The marketplace aggregate retention 
amount would now be calculated as the 
sum of the deductible amounts of all 
insurers participating in TRIA for the 
year in which a terrorist attack occurs, 
rather than a fixed amount (as an example, 
this amount would be $32 billion for the 
764 insurers we analyzed if based on 2012 
market data). 
•  The percentage that the federal govern-
ment recoups against all commercial 
policyholders would increase from 133% 
to 150% for losses subject to mandatory 
recoupment. 
AN ANALYSIS OF INSURERS’ 
DEDUCTIBLE/SURPLUS (D/S) 
RATIOS 
One measure of particular interest to insur-
ers, regulators and rating agencies alike is 
the ratio of the insurer’s TRIA deductible 
amount in relation to its surplus. A higher 
deductible/surplus (D/S) ratio implies that 
the insurer is more exposed to losses from 
a terrorist attack. While there is no specific 
threshold that applies to all insurers given 
their different portfolios, a D/S ratio greater 
than 0.15 is generally regarded as a high 
measure of relative exposure to terrorism. 
Accessing market data from the rating 
agency AM Best, we were able to determine 
the D/S ratios of 764 insurance companies 
operating in the United States and then 
calculate changes in the D/S ratio for each 
of the top 30, top 50, top 100, and top 450 
insurers as the TRIA deductible percent 
(D*) is varied from 15% (2005 level) to 20% 
and 25%. 
•  Only 3 insurers among the top 30 would 
have a D/S ratio of 0.15 or greater when 
D*=15%; this increases to 7 insurers under 
the current D*=20% and to 11 insurers 
should D*=25% (see Table 1).
• For our sample of 450 insurers, when 
D*=15%, 95 of them would have a D/S 
ratio greater than 0.15; this would 
increase to 140 insurers when D*=20% 
and to 175 insurers if D*=25%. 
Should D* be increased from its cur-
rent 20% level, some insurers could face a 
significant risk of insolvency or financial 
distress after a severe terrorist attack if they 
do not increase their levels of capital or 
obtain private reinsurance in response to the 
policy change. 
QUANTIFYING LOSS SHARING 
UNDER DIFFERENT TRIA 
DESIGNS
We worked closely with modeling firm Risk 
Management Solutions (RMS), which con-
structed the following three specific attack 
mode scenarios based on their terrorism risk 
model: (a) a 10-ton truck bomb; (b) 1-ton 
Sarin gas release; and (c) 1-kiloton nuclear 
detonation bomb. Key high-profile tar-
gets were identified in the central business 
districts of the four major cities of Chicago, 
Houston, Los Angeles and New York. 
Using the 10-ton truck bomb scenario, 
we undertake a series of analyses varying 
four TRIA design parameters: (a) insur-
ers’ deductibles; (b) level of coinsurance for 
insurers; (c) insurance industry retention 
level, to determine what part of the insured 
losses paid by the federal government will 
be mandatorily recouped against all com-
mercial policyholders in the U.S.; and (d) 
percentage of the federal payment that is 
mandatorily recouped. 
ASSUMPTIONS ON TERRORISM 
INSURANCE MARKET SHARE AND 
TAKE-UP RATES 
We have utilized market shares of insurers 
in individual states in which the four cities 
are located to allocate losses from a terrorist 
attack among the 764 largest insurers. These 
firms account for virtually 100% of the ter-
rorism insurance policies placed with U.S. 
licensed primary insurance carriers at the 
end of 2012. Property insurance lines have 
been separated from workers’ compensation 
lines.
As discussed earlier, terrorism cannot be 
excluded from workers’ compensation insur-
ance, which is required for all firms, so we 
assume a 100% take-up rate for terrorism-
related workers’ compensation losses. Based 
on studies by insurance brokers, we assume 
a 50% take-up rate for terrorism insurance 
for the property lines, recognizing that the 
actual percentage may vary from one city to 
another as well as by the type of firm. 
KEY FINDINGS  
Figures 1, 2 and 3 depict the distribution 
of terrorism losses between non-
insured firms, insurers, all commercial 
policyholders (recoupment) and taxpayers 
under the current TRIA program, and the 
Senate and House bills respectively. In the 
analysis below, we use the case of an attack 
(10-ton truck bomb) in New York City. 
The full report, TRIA After 2014, shows 
the results from Chicago, Houston and 
Los Angeles as well.  
        Based on TRIA’s current design, 
our analysis reveals that under the 
current loss-sharing arrangement, the 
federal government (taxpayers) will not 
be responsible for any payments after 
mandatory recoupment until the losses 
from a terrorist attack exceed $40 billion, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
Commercial policyholders will always 
have to pay a portion of the cost of a terror-
ist attack under the current TRIA program 
if the total loss to all industrial firms is less 
than $80 billion, and they could end up pay-
ing as much as $11.3 billion. The significant 
exposure of commercial policyholders has 
not been widely discussed.
Based on the Senate bill, American 
taxpayers would not be responsible for any 
payments after mandatory recoupment by 
the federal government until the total losses 
from a terrorist attack (insured or not) 
exceed $59 billion. 
When damage reaches $100 billion, 
the federal government will be responsible 
for nearly $31 billion in payments, insurers 
for $33 billion, commercial policyholders 
for over $5.7 billion, and the remaining $30 
billion would be uninsured. 
Commercial policyholders could pay 
more than $10 billion when total losses 
from terrorist attacks are in the range of $38 
billion to $82 billion, with a maximum of 
$17.9 billion when total losses are $54 bil-
lion, as shown in Figure 2.
TABLE 1:  D/S ANALYSIS FOR THE TOP 30 INSURERS (2012 DATA)
 
Insurers Surplus Direct Earned Premiums  20% TRIA  D/S Ratio  D/S Ratio 
 (in $ billion) in TRIA Eligible Lines Deductible (20% Deductible) (25% Deductible) 
  (in $ billion) (in $ billion)   
1. Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies  $16.8  $12.0 $2.39  14.26% 17.82%
2. Travelers Group  $19.3  $10.9 $2.18  11.29% 14.12%
3. American International Group  $29.2  $10.4 $2.08  7.14% 8.93%
4. Zurich Financial Services NA Group  $7.7  $6.7 $1.35  17.57% 21.97%
5. Hartford Insurance Group  $14.2  $5.8 $1.17  8.22% 10.28%
6. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies $13.8  $4.9 $0.98  7.10% 8.87%
7. CNA Insurance Companies $10.0  $4.6 $0.92  9.23% 11.54%
8. Nationwide Group  $13.8  $4.5 $0.89  6.45% 8.06%
9. ACE INA Group  $5.7  $4.1 $0.82  14.41% 18.02%
10. State Farm Group  $65.3  $3.1 $0.62  0.95% 1.19%
11. Allianz of America Companies  $3.6  $3.0 $0.61  16.93% 21.17%
12. FM Global Group  $7.5  $3.0 $0.60  7.99% 9.98%
13. W. R. Berkley Insurance Group  $4.7  $2.7 $0.54  11.64% 14.55%
14. Assurant P&C Group  $1.4  $2.7 $0.53  38.09% 47.61%
15. Farmers Insurance Group  $5.6  $2.6 $0.53  9.33% 11.66%
16. Philadelphia Ins Cos/Tokio Marine US  $4.2  $2.3 $0.46  11.00% 13.76%
17. QBE Americas Group  $2.3  $2.2 $0.44  19.08% 23.84%
18. Cincinnati Insurance Companies  $3.9  $2.1 $0.43  10.90% 13.63%
19. Berkshire Hathaway Insurance Group  $106.7  $1.9 $0.38  0.35% 0.44%
20. Fairfax Financial (USA) Group  $5.2  $1.9 $0.38  7.24% 9.05%
21. NY State Insurance Fund WC Fund $3.1  $1.9 $0.38  12.01% 15.01%
22. Old Republic Insurance Group  $2.8  $1.8 $0.35  12.77% 15.96%
23. Auto-Owners Insurance Group  $6.6  $1.7 $0.34  5.15% 6.43%
24. Great American P& C Insurance Group $2.1  $1.6 $0.32  15.14% 18.93%
25. Hanover Insurance Group P&C $1.5  $1.6 $0.31  20.63% 25.79%
26. Citizens Property Insurance Corporation $6.3  $1.5 $0.30  4.79% 5.99%
27. Allstate Insurance Group  $17.1  $1.2 $0.24  1.42% 1.77%
28. Munich-American Holding Corp $5.9  $1.2 $0.24  4.06% 5.08%
29. Erie Insurance Group  $5.6  $1.1 $0.22  3.84% 4.80%
30. Selective Insurance Group  $1.0 $1.1 $0.21  20.10% 25.12%
 
Based on the House bill, American 
taxpayers would not be responsible for any 
payments after mandatory recoupment by 
the federal government until the total losses 
from a terrorist attack (insured or not) 
exceed $52 billion (Figure 3). 
At a $100 billion loss, the insurers will 
be responsible for the same $33 billion as 
they would be under the Senate bill, but 
the commercial policyholders will not pay 
anything because the industry retention of 
$32 billion is below the value of insurers’ 
payments. Hence, the government recoups 
nothing from the policyholders and is left 
paying the entire $36.84 billion. 
Despite the higher 150% recoup-
ment rate, commercial policyholders would 
typically be less exposed to the mandatory 
recoupment under the proposed House 
legislation than the Senate bill. They could 
pay more than $10 billion when losses from 
terrorist attacks are between $36 to $59  
billion, with a maximum of $15.3 billion 
when losses are $46 billion, as shown in  
Figure 3.  We used $32 billion as market 
retention in the above analysis based on 
the sum of insurer deductibles for the 764 
insurers we analyzed. 
The actual mandatory recoupment 
threshold may be higher than $32 billion 
depending on actual market conditions at 
the time of the attack and if other risk-
bearing entities, such as captives, had been 
included in our study.  For instance if one 
considers market retention of $44 billion 
(estimates by the Congressional Budget 
Office for the year 2016) instead of $32 
billion, then the House bill would be such 
that American taxpayers would not be 
responsible for any payments after manda-
tory recoupment by the federal govern-
ment until the total losses from a terrorist 
attack (insured or not) exceed $74 billion; 
the maximum payment by the commercial 
policyholders would then be much higher at 
$26.8 billion.
  
FIGURE 1:  AMOUNT PAID BY STAKEHOLDERS FOR DIFFERENT LOSSES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS
 TO NEW YORK CITY UNDER CURRENT TRIA LOSS-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
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FIGURE 2:  AMOUNT PAID BY STAKEHOLDERS FOR DIFFERENT LOSSES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS
 TO NEW YORK CITY UNDER SENATE BILL S. 2244
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CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis assumes that firms suffering 
losses from a terrorist attack will not receive 
compensation from the federal govern-
ment for the uninsured portion of their 
loss. However, experience from 9/11, the 
financial crisis and recent natural disasters 
suggests that the government may assist 
firms suffering uninsured losses, and the 
amount of federal disaster relief is likely to 
depend on the magnitude of the losses.
In analyzing each of these scenarios, we 
have focused solely on the insurable losses 
under the scenario and not the broader eco-
nomic loss that would have to be addressed. 
To the extent that a terrorist attack causes 
indirect impacts, one needs to consider the 
role that insurance and other protective 
measures undertaken by firms can play in 
cushioning these longer-term economic 
effects. 
In the coming weeks and months, 
Congress and the Administration will make 
a decision about the future of TRIA after 
2014 and the nature of the risk-sharing 
arrangements between the private and 
public sectors. Over the past decade, our 
research team at the Wharton Risk Center 
has published over 20 studies on terrorism 
insurance markets based on discussions with 
many of the key stakeholders interested in 
these issues in the United States and abroad. 
We hope the analysis in this brief helps to 
inform decision makers.
FIGURE 3:  AMOUNT PAID BY STAKEHOLDERS FOR DIFFERENT LOSSES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS
 TO NEW YORK CITY UNDER HOUSE BILL H.R. 4871
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